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SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1955-1956

some convictions, to see to it that full review was, in some way,
made open to all. The Illinois Supreme Court acted promptly
to effectuate the decision so attained,6 has now provided a reasonable opportunity within which all persons convicted prior to
the date of the federal court holding may secure the benefit
thereof,65 and has also indicated that it will not automatically
apply doctrines relating to waiver and res adjudicata to those
whose convictions have heretofore been reviewed under the common law form of record. 6 It is to be expected, therefore, that
the work of the court in connection with reviewing convictions
in criminal cases will, for a time at least, become an onerous responsibility unless the legislature acts to review the statute law
67
on the subject.
V. FAMILY LAW
The year's most celebrated decision in the area of domestic
relations was that of Nudd v. Matsoukas,l wherein suit was instituted by an unemancipated minor against his father to recover
for injuries suffered in an automobile collision between a vehicle
operated by the father and that of another. Although the father 's
actions were alleged to have been wilful and wanton in character,
the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss on the ground that
a minor could not maintain an action against his parent, which
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged the fact
that the only justification for refusing an infant a right of action
against his parent is that such litigation creates family strife.
However, it took the position that the social benefit derived
thereby was not sufficient to deprive a minor of redress for in64 On June 19, 1956, the court adopted Rule 65-1; S. H. A., Ch. 110, § 101.65-1.
65 Such persons have until March 1, 1957, to procure relief.
66 See, in particular, the holding in People v. Griffin, 9 Ill. (2d) 164, 137 N. E.
(2d) 485 (1956), not in the period of this survey.
67 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 780%.
17 Ill. (2d) 106, 129 N. E. (2d) 699 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 333, 5 DePaul L. R. 302, 44 Ill. B. J. 840, 1956 Ill. L. Forum 147, 10 Southwestern L. J. 91, and 42 Va. L. R. 687.
26 Ill. App. (2d) 504, 128 N. E. (2d) 609 (1955).
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juries flowing from the wilful and wanton misconduct of the
parent. It is also worth noting that the court distinguished, but
did not overrule, two prior decisions of the Appellate Courts$
on the ground that they involved simple negligence rather than
wilful and wanton conduct.
The court did, however, reverse a position of long standing
in the case of Lalema v. Crombez,4 wherein it appeared that a
husband and wife had entered into a separation agreement waiving their respective interests in each other's property. In a
separate covenant, the latter released the former from his obligation to support her. In a subsequent suit by the husband to
establish an interest in his wife's property, the Supreme Court
concluded that, while the waiver of support was invalid as contrary to public policy, the entire agreement was not thereby rendered void. This conclusion is in direct conflict with prior decisions of the court 5 wherein the presence of a clause waiving support was held to invalidate the whole instrument.
Problems involving the welfare and custody of children required judicial attention in three cases. In the first, that of
Fountaine v. Fountaine,6 the children in question were the offspring of a Caucasian mother and a Negro father. As the
result of a divorce, the children were placed in the custody of
the father; thereafter, the mother, having remarried, filed a petition requesting custody of the children. Although the mother
was found to be a fit person by the trial court, it nevertheless
denied her petition, apparently for the reason that the children
possessed the physical characteristics of the Negro race and it
felt that they should therefore be raised in a colored household.
Upon appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, the
decision was reversed, that tribunal stating that the question of
3 Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Il. App. 164 (1933) ; and Foley v. Foley,
61 Ill. App. 577 (1895).
4 6 Ill. (2d) 194, 127 N. E. (2d) 489 (1955), noted in 34 CH-CAGO-KENT LAW
Rmv~w 185.
5 Lagow v. Snapp, 400 Ill. 414, 81 N. E. (2d) 144 (1948); and Lyons v.
Schaneacher, 316 Ill. 56_9, 147 N. E. 440 (1925).
6 9 M. App. (2d) 482, 133 N. E. (2d) 532 (1956).
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race cannot be controlling in custody matters. However, a somewhat different position was taken by the Appellate Court for
the Second District in an adoption proceeding entitled Cooper v.
Hinrichs.7 Therein, the Protestant petitioners sought to adopt
children who had been reared in the Catholic faith. The trial
court denied the petition despite the fact that the natural father
of the children was a Protestant and had consented to the adoption. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed principally because of a statute" which provides that, where possible in an
adoption proceeding, custody of children should be awarded to
individuals of the same religious faith. It appears that this
is the first judicial interpretation accorded this statute by the
reviewing courts of Illinois.
However, irrespective of the nature of the facts that influence the trial court in making its decision in such matters,
it may be said that such facts must appear in the record as was
decided in the case of Williams v. Williams.9 Therein, the Appellate Court for the First District held that error had been
committed where the trial judge based his decision, at least in
part, on the confidential report of a public welfare agency which
did not become a part of the record.
Another interesting decision this last year was that of Hallett
v. Hallett, ° wherein a wife had earlier obtained an Illinois divorce decree providing for alimony and support for her two
children. Both parties then moved to California and the wife
temporarily relinquished custody of the children to her ex-husband. Upon his refusal to return the children, a California court,
at her instance, entered a temporary order awarding her the
children and support for them at a rate less than was included
in the original Illinois decree. The wife accepted payment under this order for approximately five years and then, upon re7 8 Ill. App. (2d) 144, 130 N. E. (2d) 678 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAOO-KENT LAw
RnVrEw 248.
8 nIl. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 4-2.
9 8 Ill. App. (2d) 1, 130 N. E. (2d) 291 (1955), noted in 44 I1. B. J. 571.
10 10 IMi. App. (2d) 513, 135 N. E. (2d) 224 (1956).
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turning to Illinois, filed her petition in the original divorce action
alleging that her ex-husband was in default in an amount equal
to the difference between the payments provided for in the Illinois
order and those incorporated in the California award. The Appellate Court for the Second District held that, inasmuch as the
California order did not purport by its terms to affect the Illinois decree, it did not supersede it and, furthermore, the mere
acceptance of payments did not evidence the fact that the wife
had abandoned the provisions made for her by the Illinois court.
VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

Although there are no cases of significance involving interests
in personal property, there are several decisions of consequence
concerning proprietary interests in real estate. In the case of
Bradley v. Fox,1 the Illinois Supreme Court found it necessary to reconsider the rights of a surviving joint tenant who
had murdered his co-tenant. This problem had initially been
presented to the court some four years earlier in the case of
Welsh v. James2 where it was decided that, inasmuch as the
survivor took the whole interest by virtue of the original contract, constitutional proscription prevented a denial of his right
of survivorship. 3 Though confronted with this precedent, the
court nevertheless concluded that one of the implied conditions
of a joint tenancy is that neither party will acquire the interest
of the other by murder. Hence, it was able to say that the survivor had destroyed the joint tenancy as well as the right of
survivorship incident thereto and retained only an undivided
one-half interest in the property as a tenant in common with the
heir at law of the deceased.
17 Ini. (2d) 106, 129 N. E. (2d) 699 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 318 5 DePaul L. R. 316, 44 Ill. B. J. 353, 31 N. Y. U. L. R. 963,. 9 Vanderbilt L. R. 892, and 58 W. Va. L. R. 422.
2408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
260.
3 Forfeiture of property as a penalty for the commission of crimes is prohibited
by Ii. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 11.

